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I found the online edition of the book the IA thread is currently bouncing around...
"Psychology of Intelligence Analysis" by Richard J. Heuer Jr.
Hope it helps.
http://www.odci.gov/csi/books/19104/index.html
Jedburgh II
08-10-2005, 01:25
I would also like to recommend a relatively recent RAND paper: Out of the Ordinary: Finding Hidden Threats by Analyzing Unusual Behavior (http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2004/RAND_MG126.pdf) (187 page pdf document)
electra1978
08-10-2005, 08:09
I would also like to recommend a relatively recent RAND paper: Out of the Ordinary: Finding Hidden Threats by Analyzing Unusual Behavior (http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2004/RAND_MG126.pdf) (187 page pdf document)
Great find Jedburgh!
Here is a short list of items which I have found extremely helpful in my own research on religious terrorism as well as, and more important, my preparation for a career with the FBI as an IA. These don't necessarily relate to the craft of intel. analysis per se, but speaking as an academic I think they help to put one in the context of much of what is going on in the world, especially as it relates to CT:
1. The Qur'an. Absolutely indispensible. I quite like the translation by Nooruddin et al. as well as Ali.
2. Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996). Not uncontroversial, but I think Huntington is spot on. He argues that since the end of the Cold War in particular, conflicts are created along cultural and religious--rather than secular--lines. "In the modern world, religion is a central, perhaps the central, force that motivates and mobilizes people" (66; emphasis in original).
3. Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998). Like Huntington, Hoffman offers a remarkably prescient analysis of terrorism in a pre-9/11 book. A recent and major shift in terrorism is from nationalist or irredentist aims to religious ones. See especially ch. 4, "Religion and Terrorism" (87-129).
4. The Fundamentalism Project, eds. Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1991-). A multi-vol. academic project, but with quite a lot to say about the terrorist threat today, in particular the role played by religious fundamentalism. The authors demonstrate that fundamentalism is a trans-religious phenomenon, going far beyond either Christianity and Islam. The first vol. (Fundamentalisms Observed) is particularly helpful, especially the brief introduction ("The Fundamentalism Project: A User's Guide," vii-xiii). Marty and Appleby state: "It is no insult to fundamentalisms to see them as militant, whether in the use of words and ideas or ballots or, in extreme cases, bullets. Fundamentalists see themselves as militants. This means that the first word to employ in respect to them is that they are reactive (though not always reactionary)...Fundamentalists begin as traditionalists who perceive some challenge or threat to their core identity, both social and personal. They are not frivolous, nor do they deal with peripheral assaults. If they lose on the central issues, they believe they lose everything. They react, they fight
back with great innovative power" (ix).
5. Martin Petersen, "The Challenge for the Political Analyst." This is a recent article from Studies in Intelligence 47:1 (2003):
http://www.cia.gov/csi/studies/vol47no1/article05.html Especially important is the section, "The Foundation of Credibility," where Petersen lists six steps all analysts must follow: 1. Know your own history and culture; 2. Know the other's history and culture as they know, learn, and teach it; 3. Know the other's religion and philosophy; 4. Know the culture-bound elements of power: how it is acquired, wielded, and its acceptable and unacceptable uses; 5. Know the other's popular culture; and 6. Know the other's language.
I hope this is helpful.
Jedburgh II
08-10-2005, 11:19
I'm not a fan of Huntington, but I do like Hoffman.
CT in today's operational environment is a challenge for the analyst. In order to function effectively and apply the skills of intelligence analysis, there is a great deal one must understand about the threat.
As TD stated, regional, cultural, socio-political and linguistic knowledge as related to the threat all are necessary to the background of the analyst. But that still only provides a base upon which to develop the intel required to roll up the bad guys.
A solid grasp of tradecraft is required - clandestine communications and compartmented operational methods; just as you would if working CI. However, these bad guys aren't just trying to spy on us, they're trying to kill us. A firm understanding of cellular structure (operations and support cells, intel cells, step-by-step support cells, etc), and tradecraft/clandestine communications (dead-drops, cutouts, steganography etc.). Manipulation of association/event matrices and link diagramming are the basic tools of the trade for delineating the networks in order to eliminate them. In my experience, new analysts tend to rely too much on automated systems to perform this function for them and do not themselves develop a thorough understanding of the networks they are tracking. "Fusion" and "Synthesis" are a couple of words overused in the intel community, but it is a hard fact that no intel tool is effective in stand-alone mode. I recommend a bit of reading on the related field of Social Network Analysis (http://www.insna.org/) to give a little depth to link analysis.
Something often forgotten; attack methods. What the military calls tactics, techniques, and procedures. In order to truly understand the functioning of operational and support cells, you need to have at least a base-line understanding of the characteristics of potential threat weapons and explosives - especially improvised explosive devices - and how they are used. You can't work out how a step-by-step support cell is operating to provide a device to an operational cell if you don't understand how such a device is constructed, just as you can't establish a potential threat course of action if you don't understand how the various weapons systems and explosive devices can be employed.
The WMD threat is another one that requires a bit of self-education for most. On this topic, I recommend subscribing to the Center for Non-Proliferation Studies (http://www.cns.miis.edu/) ChemBio-Terror News Listserv. It is sent out 3 times a week, and focuses on chemical and biological weapons, nonproliferation, and WMD terrorism.
CT also slips over into Crime. Disassociated terrorist networks have been known to exploit transnational gangs and international organized crime networks for support in a manner that makes it even more difficult to derive clear links between the expendable bombers & shooters and the mid-to-senior level guys conducting the planning and providing guidance. They don't seem to be fully exploiting this potential yet - but it is our responsibility to monitor any potential trends and patterns so that we don't discover it after after the fact.
Just a few scattered thoughts...
I'm not a fan of Huntington, but I do like Hoffman.
CT in today's operational environment is a challenge for the analyst. In order to function effectively and apply the skills of intelligence analysis, there is a great deal one must understand about the threat.
As TD stated, regional, cultural, socio-political and linguistic knowledge as related to the threat all are necessary to the background of the analyst. But that still only provides a base upon which to develop the intel required to roll up the bad guys.
Jedburgh,
Thanks for your post. You hit on what excites me the most about becoming an IA, namely, the mix of different backgrounds of the IAs themselves. I know I'm not the only one from academe, and while I do have extensive research experience I simply lack the practical or operational experience someone like yourself has. I think this combination of backgrounds could be a great asset to the FBI as its intel. cadre continues to be developed.
Such development must mean, however, a cultural shift in the FBI. Intel. analysis now seems to be focusing increasingly on preventing terrorist acts from taking place, rather than working on solving what has already happened and ultimately leading to prosecution. The former is much more ambiguous, tentative, and predictive, while the latter--the stock in trade of LE--is much more linear and case driven. There are bound to be growing pains, as it were, as intel. analysis develops in the FBI, but I am only too happy to do my part.
I remember during my interview asking one of the IAs how intel. analysis is taught. Not simply ACES, but rather how one really learns tradecraft. He told me it's basically learning by doing: one is an acolyte, following another IA and learing on the job. This reminded me of another (I think) helpful article: Wilhelm Agrell's "When Everything is Intelligence--Nothing is Intelligence" (The Sherman Kent Center for Intelligence Analysis Occassional Papers 1:4): http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/Kent_Papers/pdf/OPNo4.pdf
Agrell argues for the need of a theoretical fundament for intel. analysis in order to link theory and practice. In other words, to make intel. analysis a profession, to move from "learning-by-doing to learning-by-training, based on theory, verifiable methods, and self-reflection" (6).
I also found Thomas O'Connor's article, "Intelligence Analysis," quite helpful: http://faculty.ncwc.edu/toconnor/427/427lect04.htm
Any thoughts? Thanks!
Jedburgh II
08-11-2005, 17:27
…Intel. analysis now seems to be focusing increasingly on preventing terrorist acts from taking place, rather than working on solving what has already happened and ultimately leading to prosecution. The former is much more ambiguous, tentative, and predictive, while the latter--the stock in trade of LE--is much more linear and case driven.
Following 9/11 there was a great deal of debate about whether or not we should establish a domestic intelligence agency along the lines of MI5 – or finally establish a true intelligence capability within the Bureau. (Confronting the Enemy Within: Security Intelligence, the Police, and Counterterrorism in Four Democracies (http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2004/RAND_MG100.pdf)) Of course, the IA positions we are all hoping to fill exist because the latter path won out.
In my personal experience, the collection and analysis of intelligence in counterterrorism or counterinsurgency fuses both the reactive and predictive. Solid post-incident investigative methodology is a core requirement – we can’t stop’em every time, and the incidents that do occur provide leads to those ultimately responsible. Concurrently, all-source collection supporting predictive analysis continues to reap information that must also be sifted through to determine potential links with information in the incident database. The effective targeting of collection systems against terrorism should be driven by an efficient blending of post-incident investigation and current requirements so that the application of analytic methodology isn’t divided in the direction of one or the other, but combines elements of both – reactive and predictive.
Most of the Studies in Intelligence (http://www.odci.gov/csi/kent_csi/Default.htm) articles are focused on strategic intel, and are not necessarily directly applicable to the manner in which intel supporting Bureau ops needs to be focused. We already have agencies whose reason for existence is the production of strategic intelligence – recreating that capability within the Bureau should not be the focus of the FBI intel establishment.
However, I do feel strongly that the FBI does require an intel capability to support its mission. Along with establishing that capability, the information-sharing problem with the various federal, state and local agencies also requires solving. We don’t need multiple agencies with identical capabilities – we need agencies with trained and professional IAs, focused on their specific missions, who are able to reach out to their peers in other agencies when necessary – which is damn near all the time. I feel that, although we are still experiencing severe growing pains, we have made great progress along that road. Look at the various JTTFs for example. Today's new IAs should be raised in an environment where multi-agency intelligence cooperation at the tactical, operational and strategic levels is the norm, not the exception.
I remember during my interview asking one of the IAs how intel. analysis is taught. Not simply ACES, but rather how one really learns tradecraft. He told me it's basically learning by doing: one is an acolyte, following another IA and learning on the job.
If you read the DoJ IG report on the Bureau’s efforts to hire, train and retain IAs (http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/reports/FBI/a0520/final.pdf) you understand that the training program is a work in-progress. The report was published back in May, but several of BuMan’s comments seem to show that the structure of intel training within the FBI is still not settled at this time.
An intel mentoring program is a wonderful thing – I have seen it work effectively in other organizations, and I’m sure its working to a limited extent in the Bureau. The only potential hold-back is the FBI’s currently small number of experienced analysts vs the number of planned new hires. But the Bureau also seems to be developing a professional career path, with professional development opportunities that would include cross-training with other agencies. This is to be expected, as it is what every other entity in the community has been doing for a very long now.
Professional development in most agencies consists of a mix of mandatory training at various levels, elective training opportunities with other agencies, services, and nations, mentoring by seniors and networking with peers, as well as the willingness of the individual to seek out professional organizations, training, and other information for self-development. Of course, there is still no substitute for operational experience - but with the caveat that we must all take care to understand that an untrained or poorly trained individual ingrains bad habits with their experience. And the effect of the negative can multiply much faster in the middle of an operation than the effect of the positive, often with disastrous consequences. So, there is also no substitute for good entry-level training.
Following 9/11 there was a great deal of debate about whether or not we should establish a domestic intelligence agency along the lines of MI5 – or finally establish a true intelligence capability within the Bureau. (Confronting the Enemy Within: Security Intelligence, the Police, and Counterterrorism in Four Democracies (http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2004/RAND_MG100.pdf)) Of course, the IA positions we are all hoping to fill exist because the latter path won out.
In my personal experience, the collection and analysis of intelligence in counterterrorism or counterinsurgency fuses both the reactive and predictive. Solid post-incident investigative methodology is a core requirement – we can’t stop’em every time, and the incidents that do occur provide leads to those ultimately responsible. Concurrently, all-source collection supporting predictive analysis continues to reap information that must also be sifted through to determine potential links with information in the incident database. The effective targeting of collection systems against terrorism should be driven by an efficient blending of post-incident investigation and current requirements so that the application of analytic methodology isn’t divided in the direction of one or the other, but combines elements of both – reactive and predictive.
Most of the Studies in Intelligence (http://www.odci.gov/csi/kent_csi/Default.htm) articles are focused on strategic intel, and are not necessarily directly applicable to the manner in which intel supporting Bureau ops needs to be focused. We already have agencies whose reason for existence is the production of strategic intelligence – recreating that capability within the Bureau should not be the focus of the FBI intel establishment.
However, I do feel strongly that the FBI does require an intel capability to support its mission. Along with establishing that capability, the information-sharing problem with the various federal, state and local agencies also requires solving. We don’t need multiple agencies with identical capabilities – we need agencies with trained and professional IAs, focused on their specific missions, who are able to reach out to their peers in other agencies when necessary – which is damn near all the time. I feel that, although we are still experiencing severe growing pains, we have made great progress along that road. Look at the various JTTFs for example. Today's new IAs should be raised in an environment where multi-agency intelligence cooperation at the tactical, operational and strategic levels is the norm, not the exception.
Well said. The terrorist threat today is far more diffused than in the past. The religious aspect alone is a major factor of this. Not only are the reactive and predictive fused, but I should think any compartmentalization is relative at best. CT ought to be distinguished from CI, financial crimes, drug trafficking, etc., but in reality the distinctions are more ambiguous. I suspect part and parcel of CT is the disruption of terrorist cell recruitment, aspects of which would include (it seems to me, at least) CI; drug trafficking supports terrorist groups, along with concomitant financial crimes, etc.
Case in point: If I were an IA today, two key areas of interest to me would be the problem of identifying Islamist recruitment efforts in the US among American Muslims and assessing the degree and dimension of sleeper cells in the US. What has prevented the co-option and infiltration of the American Muslim community by Islamists (to date, at any rate) but not among the Muslim diaspora in Europe (e.g., Madrid, the Netherlands, London)? What does that tell us about what needs to be done to make sure it doesn't become a problem here? So even though I might be in a particular division, all these issues have play across division lines.
The bottom line, then, is that it is highly doubtful that an IA can (or ought to) say, "I only do CT." All the elements support each other. In fact, it is the hyper-specialization of academe that initially got me to consider a nonacademic career: if you do x as your area of specialization (largely determined by your dissertation topic), that determines the lion's share of your research for a long time to come (at least until tenure). And forget about crossing departmental or disciplinary lines. The reverse seems to be the case with IA--the work seems to be far more diverse and vastly more relevant than anything I have ever done in academe. All the IAs at my panel interview confirmed this.
These are only my impressions as an outsider (hopefully not much longer, though!). And thoughts?
Jedburgh II
08-13-2005, 02:49
The terrorist threat today is far more diffused than in the past. The religious aspect alone is a major factor of this. Not only are the reactive and predictive fused, but I should think any compartmentalization is relative at best. CT ought to be distinguished from CI, financial crimes, drug trafficking, etc., but in reality the distinctions are more ambiguous. I suspect part and parcel of CT is the disruption of terrorist cell recruitment, aspects of which would include (it seems to me, at least) CI; drug trafficking supports terrorist groups, along with concomitant financial crimes, etc.
As I’m coming from Army Military Intelligence, I really can’t say with any authority how well or how poorly the Bureau is currently executing not only the sharing, but the effective synthesis of intelligence between the sectors of CT, CI, Cyber and Crime. So, keep in mind that these are just my personal perceptions based on that experience.
I’ve already mentioned how the clandestine communications methods used by operational terrorist cells is similar to that used by hostile intelligence in the conduct of espionage against the US – thus linking CI and CT in certain analytic methodologies in determining threat activities, if nothing else.
You brought up the financing of terrorism – since 9/11 this has been a very high priority. Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (http://www.fincen.gov/) puts terrorist financing first in its mission statement. But it is now much more complex than the drug trafficking, smuggling, extortion, robbery or straight-forward state support that were the standbys of the older leftist revolutionary terrorist groups we dealt with in the good ol’ days.
Don’t misunderstand me; those methods are still very much in use. This paper is an excellent study of such “traditional” funding: Terrorism, Diasporas and Permissive Threat Environments: A Study of of Hizballah’s Fundraising Operations in Paraguay and Ecuador (http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/hizb-fund.pdf)
For balance, here is a paper on alternative methods receiving more focus these days: Informal Value Transfer Systems, Terrorism and Money Laundering (http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles1/nij/grants/208301.pdf)
To link CT with Crime, as I mentioned in another discussion thread on this board, both international organized crime and transnational gangs (http://www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi/pdffiles/PUB597.pdf), by their very nature, can provide services-for-hire to an operational terrorist cell attempting to obtain or smuggle in weapons, explosives or people. Other support functions such as acquiring vehicles or small boats and aircraft without leaving a paper trail, money laundering, and the provision of a wide variety of forged documentation are also readily available. A professionally-run compartmented terrorist organization, with dispersed and disposable operational cells acting under the guidance of disassociated leadership is already difficult to roll up. By exploiting such support activities that a more conventional-type terror organization would try to fill with its own support/logistics cells or by support from known friendly states or other known, allied actors puts a degree of separation in the lead-up to a terrorist attack that it makes it even more difficult to detect.
In the past, tracking these types of links have certainly suffered from parochialism and turf protection among and within various agencies. But even with multi-agency intelligence cooperation and coordination, these types of links are extremely difficult to put together in a manner that allows us to roll up and stop the real bad guys. By that I mean the planners and coordinators - not the disposable bombers and shooters.
Cyber is so clearly important in any context as it blends into nearly every aspect of our everyday lives, it doesn’t need any discussion. I recall someone in the IA thread mentioned he had a background in digital forensics – that’s a critical skill these days.
The bottom line, then, is that it is highly doubtful that an IA can (or ought to) say, "I only do CT." All the elements support each other.
Bingo! But a big part of that is training the cherry IA to understand, appreciate, and be able to fully exploit not only the capabilities within their agency, but to have the ability and confidence to do the same with all other federal, state and local agencies, as well as our international partners – dependent upon the mission. There are still plenty of roadblocks out there – but they are being chipped away bit by bit with each passing day. Some of it is more informal peer networking as opposed to formal information sharing – but we’re getting there.
What has prevented the co-option and infiltration of the American Muslim community by Islamists (to date, at any rate) but not among the Muslim diaspora in Europe (e.g., Madrid, the Netherlands, London)?
It is unrealistic to believe there has not been an infiltration of the American Muslim community by both fundamentalists and extremists (the latter group being a subset of the former). The hate filled rhetoric you see coming from masjids elsewhere may be more visible in some regards, but it is also found here in the US and has been here many years. Among other books that are worth reading on this topic, I always recommend American Jihad by Steven Emerson.
It is unrealistic to believe there has not been an infiltration of the American Muslim community by both fundamentalists and extremists (the latter group being a subset of the former). The hate filled rhetoric you see coming from masjids elsewhere may be more visible in some regards, but it is also found here in the US and has been here many years. Among other books that are worth reading on this topic, I always recommend American Jihad by Steven Emerson.
Good point, and a frightening one, too. Theo van Gogh's murder was something I had in mind. One never knows what is around the corner, though.
It is unrealistic to believe there has not been an infiltration of the American Muslim community by both fundamentalists and extremists (the latter group being a subset of the former).
I think the problem is MUCH bigger than just infiltration of foreign terror elements into American Muslim communities.
From my personal experience, I see more and MORE American born muslims, who NEVER left the American shores are showing some very serious violent tendencies that some of the foriegn types are showing ... violent tendencies against fellow Americans.
The "fight" is coming closer and closer to home.... unfortunately.
I think the problem is MUCH bigger than just infiltration of foreign terror elements into American Muslim communities.
From my personal experience, I see more and MORE American born muslims, who NEVER left the American shores are showing some very serious violent tendencies that some of the foriegn types are showing ... violent tendencies against fellow Americans.
The "fight" is coming closer and closer to home.... unfortunately.
Care to elaborate on your personal experience?
I think the problem is MUCH bigger than just infiltration of foreign terror elements into American Muslim communities.
Fundamentalism and extremism are of course not unique to foreign nations. The term "infiltration" in this case refers more to an extremist element (regardless of origin) moving into a moderate masjid and eventually forcing out the moderate element. It should come as no surprise that there are American born Muslims who will fall into the extremist category, though I would argue in some cases the so-called American extremists are primarily criminals using Islam solely as a cover for their own criminal activity (such as fraud and drug dealing, and lacking anything more than a rudimentary understanding of Islam), rather than true religious extremists.
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